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Abstract
I explore some of the issues that arise when trying to establish a con-
nection between the underspecification hypothesis pursued in the NLP
literature and work on ambiguity in semantics and in the psychological
literature. A theory of underspecification is developed ‘from the first prin-
ciples’, i.e., starting from a definition of what it means for a sentence to be
semantically ambiguous and from what we know about the way humans
deal with ambiguity. An underspecified language is specified as the trans-
lation language of a grammar covering sentences that display three classes
of semantic ambiguity: lexical ambiguity, scopal ambiguity, and referen-
tial ambiguity. The expressions of this language denote sets of senses. A
formalization of defeasible reasoning with underspecified representations
is presented, based on Default Logic. Some issues to be confronted by
such a formalization are discussed.
1 The Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle
The alternative syntactic readings of a sentence such as (1) probably number
in the hundreds, whereas sentences such as (2) would have hundreds of thou-
sands scopally distinct readings if all permutations of scope-taking sentence
constituents were considered admissible readings. Yet, human beings appear
able to deal with these sentences effortlessly.
(1) We should move the engine at Avon, engine E1, to Dansville to pick up
the boxcar there, then move it from Dansville to Corning, load some
oranges, and then move it on to Bath.
(2) A politician can fool most voters on most issues most of the time, but
no politician can fool all voters on every single issue all of the time.
∗This paper will appear in K. van Deemter and S. Peters (eds), Semantic Ambiguity and
Underspecification, CSLI.
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ThisCombinatorial Explosion Puzzle is one of the most fundamental ques-
tions to be addressed by a theory of language processing, and a substantial prob-
lem for developers of Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems. NLP systems
which have to perform non-linguistic actions like booking a flight in response to
an user’s utterance must arrive at the preferred interpretation of their input in
the context of the conversation, if one exists; otherwise, they must realize that
their input is ambiguous and request a clarification. Examples such as (1) and
(2) indicate that such systems cannot adopt the sentence processing strategy of
generating all the readings of an ambiguous sentence and choosing one of them,
because there are too many such readings.1 In order to develop such systems, a
theory of ambiguity processing is needed that is consistent both with linguistic
facts and with what is known about the way humans disambiguate.
Work on underspecified representations such as (Alshawi , 1992; Poe-
sio , 1991; Reyle , 1993)2 differs from other work on discourse interpretation
(Charniak and Goldman , 1988; Hobbs et al. , 1990; Pereira and Pollack , 1991;
Dalrymple et al. , 1991; Hwang and Schubert , 1993; Kamp and Reyle , 1993)
because it is explicitly motivated by the Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle, and
aims at a unified account of all interpretation processes, including those that
occur before the scope of all operators has been determined. The work on un-
derspecified representations holds the promise of yielding a better account of the
way interpretive processes such as scope disambiguation and reference resolution
affect each other.
The existing theories of underspecification, however, have been motivated al-
most exclusively by computational considerations. For example, the semantics
assigned to underspecified representations is designed so as to support those in-
ferences that are deemed useful for an economical approach to disambiguation,
rather than being motivated by an analysis of the phenomenon of ambiguity.
In this paper I explore some of the issues that arise when trying to establish a
connection between work on underspecification and, on the one side, work on
ambiguity in semantics; on the other side, work on ambiguity in the psycho-
logical literature. A theory of underspecification is developed ‘from the first
principles’, i.e., starting from a definition of what it means for a sentence to be
semantically ambiguous and from what we know about the way humans deal
with ambiguity. The goal is to arrive at a linguistically and cognitively plausible
theory of ambiguity and underspecification that, in addition to computational
gains, may provide a better understanding of how humans process language.3
Many of the issues discussed in this paper arose from work on the TRAINS
project at the University of Rochester, in which the issues of language compre-
1With current technology, the real problem is not so much the size of the search space, but
how to choose among these interpretations, most of which are plausible.
2An early attempt at a model of discourse interpretation of this kind was made by Hobbs,
e.g., (Hobbs , 1983).
3A recent example of work also attempting to exploit the properties of underspecified
representations to address linguistic questions is (Crouch , 1995).
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hension, planning, and reasoning encountered in task-oriented natural language
conversations are studied (Allen et al. , 1995). The theory of ambiguity proposed
in this paper is the basis for the implemented surface discourse interpretation
system SAD-93, used in the TRAINS-93 demo system. SAD-93 is described in
(Poesio , 1994).
2 Ambiguity in Natural Language
2.1 Ambiguity and Grammar
2.1.1 Characterizing Ambiguity
The dictionary definitions of the terms ambiguity and ambiguous try to cap-
ture the intuition that an expression is ambiguous if ‘it has multiple meanings’.
An example are the following entries, from Webster’s:
• am.big.u.ous |am-’big-y*-w*s| aj [L ambiguus, fr. ambigere to wander
about, fr. ambi- + agere to drive – more at agent]
. . .
2: capable of being understood in two or more possible senses : equivocal
- am.big.u.ous.ly av
• am.bi.gu.ity |am-b*-’gyu:-*t-e-| n : the quality or state of being ambiguous
in meaning; also : an ambiguous word or expression
A more precise characterization of the notion of ambiguity is required to dif-
ferentiate ambiguity from vagueness or indeterminacy, for example, or to
clarify notions such as homonimy and polysemy (see below).4
An early attempt at making the notion of ambiguity more precise was pre-
sented in (Lakoff , 1970). Lakoff proposed linguistic tests that could be used to
tell whether a sentence was ambiguous or not.5 (Lakoff’s tests were meant to
provide a way for distinguishing ambiguous sentences from indeterminate ones.)
4A sentence is indeterminate, or unspecified, if it is definitely true or false, but it could
be made more specific. Zwicky and Sadock (1975) bring the example of the sentence My
sister is the Ruritanian secretary of state, which is indeterminate as to whether “. . . my sister
is older or younger than I am, whether she acceeded to her post recently or some time ago,
whether the post is hers by birth or by merit,” and so forth. The point is that these additional
facts do not affect the truth value of the sentence. It hardly needs to be pointed out that
just about every sentence is indeterminate / unspecific in some respects. I will use the term
indeterminate for these sentences, and reserve the term underspecified for sentences which
may have different truth values depending on the way the facts are ‘filled in’ (see below).
5An example of these tests are the identity tests, one of which is the conjunction
test. The (presumed) ambiguity of sentences such as They say her duck derives from the fact
that the phrase her duck can either be a NP or a bare infinitival complement. The sentence
They saw her swallow should have a similar ambiguity. If these two sentences were really
ambiguous as claimed, a sentence such as They saw her swallow and her duck should only
have two readings instead of four since conjunction requires its two arguments to be of the
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Zwicky and Sadock (1975) showed, however, that such tests do not result in an
unambiguous classification of sentences, and that a formal characterization of
the concepts of ambiguity and indeterminacy was required even to understand
what these ‘ambiguity tests’ really test.6
2.1.2 Meaning, Sense, and Ambiguity
One problem to be tackled in attempting to make precise the definition of ambi-
guity is to say what ‘meanings’ and ‘senses’ are. In modern semantic theory, the
meaning assigned to an expression by a grammar is a function from contexts (or
discourse situations) to senses. Roughly speaking, the discourse situation
provides a value for all context-dependent aspects of the sentence; the sense of
a sentence (what we get once we resolve its context-dependent aspects) tells us
under which circumstances in the world the sentence is true or false.7
Not all notions of ‘sense’ employed in the literature can serve as the basis for
a definition of ambiguity. For example, of the various notions of proposition
(the sense of sentences), the simplest is the one according to which propositions
are truth values. But if we were to use this notion of sense, the sentence Kermit
croaked, ambiguous between a reading in which Kermit utters a frog-like sound
and a reading in which he dies, would be classified as unambiguous with respect
to all models in which Kermit has both the property of dying and the property
of producing a frog-like sound, or he (it) has neither property. In other words,
in providing a definition of ambiguity we find the same need for a fine-grained
notion of sense that has been observed in connection with the semantics of atti-
tude reports.8 A model-theoretic definition of ambiguity requires a finer-grained
notion of proposition than simply truth values. In most recent semantic theo-
ries, senses are intensional objects; the simplest way of achieving intensionality
is to use functions from possible worlds or situations to referents as one finds in
Montague Grammar, where, for example, propositions are functions from pos-
sible worlds to truth values. This simple form of intensionality will be sufficient
for the purposes of the present paper.9
same type, and therefore the ’crossed’ readings should not be available. This is indeed the
case. On the other hand, an indeterminate sentence such as My sister is the Ruritanian
secretary of state maintains all of its indeterminateness once conjoined, as in My sister is the
Ruritanian secretary of state and a prominent composer.
6For example, Zwicky and Sadock observed that such tests can only identify polar ambi-
guities (such as the ambiguity of game between two entirely independent readings), but not
privative ambiguities, like those displayed by a term like dog which can be used both to
indicate generic individual of the Canis species and a male element of it.
7For a discussion of these assumptions, see (Kaplan , 1977), (Barwise and Perry , 1983),
or chapter 2 of (Pinkal , 1995).
8In the case of attitude reports, the problem is to make sure that if John is tall and John
is stupid are both true in a model, Bill believes that John is tall does not entail Bill believes
that John is stupid in that model, assuming that propositions are the semantic correlate of
sentential complements.
9More complex notions of propositions have been introduced in the literature on proposi-
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2.1.3 A Semantic Theory of Ambiguity
The notions of ‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ just discussed are the starting point for
the semantic account of the notion of ambiguity and its relation with vagueness
developed by Pinkal ((1985), translated as (Pinkal , 1995)). Pinkal introduces
the notion of indefiniteness to subsume both ambiguity and vagueness. He
defines indefiniteness as follows:
Definition 2.1 A sentence is semantically indefinite if and only if in cer-
tain situations, despite sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts, neither “true”
nor “false” can be clearly assigned as its truth value.
Pinkal formalizes the notion of indefiniteness in terms of precisification.10
According to Pinkal, a linguistic expression is semantically indefinite if it has
the potential for being made precise in distinct ways. For example, the sentence
The Santa Maria is a fast ship containing the degree adjective fast can be ‘made
precise’ (and assigned a definite truth value) either with respect to a context in
which ‘fast’ is interpreted as ‘fast for a modern ship’, in which case the sentence
is false; or with respect to a context in which ‘fast’ is interpreted as ‘fast for
a ship of her age’, in which case the sentence can be true or false, depending
on the class of comparison. Let p and q be two propositions. Proposition p is
more precise than q iff (i) p is true (false) under all states of the world under
which q is true (false), and (ii) p is true or false under certain circumstances
under which q is indefinite. The idea of precisification is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 Expression α in context c can be precisified to s if and only
if (i) s is a sense that α can assume according to its meaning; and (ii) s is more
precise than the sense of α in c.
The connection between indefiniteness and precisification is provided by the
following Precisification Principle:
Precisification Principle : A sentence is of indefinite truth value in a context
if and only if it can be precisified alternatively to “true” or to “false”.
which Pinkal also reformulates as follows:
Extended Precisification Principle An expression is semantically indefinite
in a context iff it can assume different senses in that context.
Pinkal does not equate ambiguity with vagueness. His theory includes, in addi-
tion to the notion of precisification, additional criteria to differentiate different
tional attitudes, such as those used in Situation Semantics (Barwise and Cooper , 1993) or
Property Theory (Turner , 1992).
10A treatment of ambiguity and vagueness in terms of precisifications was proposed early
on in (Fine , 1975).
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forms of ambiguity, as well as differentiating ‘pure’ ambiguity from ‘pure’ vague-
ness. The intuition he is trying to capture is that “. . . whether an expression
is ambiguous or only vague is a question that cannot be cleared once and for
all. Indefiniteness is perceived as ambiguity when alternative precisifications are
predominant, as vagueness when an unstructured continuum presents itself:”
Ambiguity (Pinkal) : If the precisification spectrum of an expression is per-
ceived as discrete, we may call it ambiguous; if it is perceived as continu-
ous, we may call it vague.
Pinkal identifies two fundamental types of ambiguity, according to whether an
expression has, or does not have, a ‘wider’ sense that could be taken as most ‘ba-
sic’. For example, ball does not have a wide sense of ‘round object and dancing
party’, whereas American may either mean ‘person from the US’ or ‘person
from the American continent’. He classifies expressions like American which
have a wider sense as having a multiplicity of use, whereas expressions such
as ball or green which do require precisification are called narrowly am-
biguous. The cases of ambiguity in the narrow sense are further distinguished
in two classes, depending on whether they are subject to the Precisification
Imperative. Although the two interpretations of green are distinct, it is pos-
sible of an object to be both green in the ‘ripe’ sense and green in the ‘color’
sense: for example, a green apricot. An object cannot, however, be a ‘band’
both in the musical group sense and in the piece of tape sense. Pinkal proposes
that polysemous expressions behave like green, and calls all of these expres-
sions P-type ambiguous; expressions like band, however, are true homonyms,
and therefore he calls them H-type ambiguous. These latter are defined as
follows:
Precisification Imperative : An expression is H-type ambiguous iff its base
level is inadmissible, i.e., if it requires precisification.
For my purposes, it’s not particularly important whether the difference between
homonimy and polysemy is completely captured by the Precisification Imper-
ative; what is important is the claim that H-type ambiguous expressions need
precisification, and furthermore, that the Precisification Imperative “is a second
order phenomenon . . . that lies beyond the scope of a strictly truth-conditional
approach.” ((Pinkal , 1995), p. 86–87). I will provide below independent rea-
sons for including a formalization of reasoning in context in a treatment of
ambiguity, and I will argue that such formalization provides the necessary tools
to express the Precisification Imperative.
To summarize, a sentence is H-type ambiguous iff the grammar assigns to
it distinct precisifications (senses) in a given discourse situation, and if the
‘base level’ of the expression requires precisification. Thus, the sentence Kermit
croaked is considered ambiguous since in the ‘empty context’ that provides all
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the senses of the expression according to the grammar G for English, that sen-
tence has two senses: the proposition that attributes to Kermit the property of
producing the sound that frogs produce, and the proposition that attributes to
Kermit the property of dying. (I am assuming here that terms like Kermit refer
unambiguously.) On the other hand, the sentence Kermit kissed Miss Piggy
would be considered unambiguous with respect to the same context.
Although Pinkal is only concerned with lexical ambiguity, the precisification
approach can also be used to classify as ambiguous sentences which have more
than one structural analysis (like the sentence They saw her duck) or are scopally
ambiguous (cfr. the sentence Everybody didn’t leave) whenever the grammar
assigns to them more than one sense. I will discuss below how Pinkal’s system
can be extended to scopal and referential ambiguity.11
2.1.4 The Disjunction Fallacy
It is important to realize that saying that a sentence is ambiguous in a context if
it has distinct precisifications is not the same as saying that an ambiguous sen-
tence is equivalent to the disjunction of its distinct precisifications. Intuitively,
in uttering S, whose two precisifications are the propositions P and Q, a speaker
may have meant P or she may have meant Q, but the following does not hold:
[[A means that P] ∨ [A means that Q]] ≡ [A means that [P ∨ Q]]
To treat an ambiguous sentence in such a way would be tantamount to propose
that an ambiguous sentence has a single sense in any given discourse situa-
tion, namely, the proposition that is true at a situation if either of the distinct
11Another way of providing a precise definition of ambiguity has been explored in the
literature, that we might call structural or syntactic. An example of structural definition is
the following, from Gillon ((Gillon , 1990), p. 400):
Ambiguity (Gillon) : An expression is ambiguous iff the expression can accomodate more
than one structural analysis.
This definition relies on the assumption made in transformational theories of grammar such as
Government and Binding theory (Chomsky , 1981; Haegeman , 1991), that each interpretation
of a sentence is a quadruple 〈PF,DS,SS,LF〉, each of whose elements is a structured object:
PF characterizes the phonetic interpretation, DS the predicate/argument composition of the
sentence, SS its surface syntactic analysis, and LF its logical analysis. A sentence (string) is
ambiguous iff it can be characterized by distinct quadruples, and this may happen not only for
phonetical or syntactic reasons, but also for semantical reasons, since one of the components
of a structural characterization of a sentence, the ‘LF,’ encodes the semantic interpretation of
the sentence.
The problem with this definition is that a purely syntactic analysis of meaning introduces
spurious distinctions: for example, unless something is said about invariance under renaming
of variables, one would predict from a structural definition that even a sentence with a single
quantifier such as Every man left is infinitely ambiguous, because all structures of the form
[S [NP every x man][x left]], for any choice of the variable, are appropriate (and distinct) LF
constituents of a sentence’s interpretation. Another case of spurious ambiguity is discussed
below. A semantic characterization of ambiguity avoids this problem.
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interpretations of the sentence is true at that situation; but according to the
definition above, an ambiguous sentence is one which has more than one sense
at a discourse situation. For example, according to the definition of ambiguity
discussed above, the listener of an utterance of They saw her duck could either
interpret the speaker as saying that the contextually determined set of individ-
uals denoted by the pronoun they saw a contextually specified female person
lowering herself, or as saying that that set of individuals saw the pet waterfowl
of that female person. According to the disjunction theory, instead, the listener
would attribute to the speaker of that sentence a single meaning, albeit a dis-
junctive one; namely, that it was either the case that they saw a contextually
specified female person lowering herself, or it was the case that they saw the pet
waterfowl of that female person.12
I will refer to the idea that a semantically ambiguous sentence denotes the
disjunction of its alternative interpretations as the disjunction fallacy. The
disjunction fallacy can be found in the literature in two forms. Its ‘purest’ form
is the hypothesis that the interpretation process literally involves generating all
of the senses of an expression and putting them together in a disjunction. In this
form, the disjunction ’theory’ is not simply counterintuitive; it doesn’t explain
the combinatorial explosion puzzle at all. As far as I know, this ‘explicit’ form
of the theory has only been discussed jokingly. One can find in the literature,
however, an ‘implicit’ form of the disjunction theory, in theories of underspeci-
fication that assign to underspecified expressions a semantics that makes them
equivalent to the disjunction of their readings. One such proposal is (Poesio ,
1991); the semantics of UDRSs is also disjunctive (Reyle , 1993).
2.2 The Role of Syntactic and Semantic Constraints
Although the number of logical form permutations that one can obtain for a
particular sentence by, e.g., considering all the permutations of its operators may
be rather large, constraints of a syntactic and/or semantic nature drastically
reduce this number.
In the case of scopal ambiguity, for example, permutations may not corre-
spond to actual readings for at least three reasons. First of all, some of these
permutations result in logical expressions that are either ill-formed or contra-
dictory,as noted by, e.g., Hobbs an Shieber (1987). For example, (3a), in the
interpretation in which the pronoun he is anaphoric on the NP every man, does
not have a reading in which the NP the woman hei married outscopes the NP
every mani. There is no well-formed logical expression that may represent this
reading. Hobbs and Shieber point out that this constraint also prevents a quan-
tifier to scope between a noun and its complement: for example, a meeting may
12A cute example of the problems with the theory is presented by (Stallard , 1987). If
ambiguous sentences were to denote the disjunction of their readings, then the answer to the
question Does the butcher have kidneys? should always be ’yes’.
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not scope inside most but outside each in (3b).13
(3) a. Every mani loves the woman hei married.
b. Most people on each committee attended a meeting.
Another reason why the number of actual readings of a sentence is much smaller
than the number of permutations of its operators is that two distinct permuta-
tions may correspond to semantically equivalent readings. For example, (4) has
only one reading, even though (at least) two equivalent logical expressions can
be obtained as the translation of the sentence.14
(4) A student saw a dog.
Finally, the readings corresponding to certain permutations may be unavailable
because of syntactic constraints. Much work on uncovering readings that are
absent due to constraints on syntactic trasformations and/or conditions on syn-
tactic levels of representation has been done in the generative tradition (May ,
1985).
Some of the constraints proposed in this literature have been proved to yield
quite robust predictions. Perhaps the best known example of syntactic con-
straint is the observation that a quantifier cannot take scope outside the clause
in which it appears. The observation that clauses serve as ‘scope islands’ goes
back at least to Rodman (1976), but was discussed most extensively by May
(1985); the constraint was called Scope Constraint by Heim (1982). The
Scope Constraint is exemplified by the contrast in (5): whereas (5a) has a read-
ing in which every department is allowed to take wide scope over a student, this
reading is not available for (5b), even though arguably from every department
and who was from every department have the same denotation.
(5) a. A student from every department was at the party.
b. A student who was from every department was at the party.
Although syntactic and semantic constraints do not rule out all possible readings—
for example, a sentence like They saw her duck still has more than one inter-
pretation under all of these theories—a theory of disambiguation must be such
that these constraints can play a role.
2.3 Perceived Ambiguity
As noted by Hirst (1987), the discussions of ambiguity processing in the NLP
literature tend to ignore the fact that humans are aware that sentences can be
ambiguous, and that they can exploit the ambiguity of sentences for rhetori-
cal effect. Raskin, for example, claims (1985) that humor crucially relies on
ambiguity. He discusses examples such as the following (p. 25-26):
13Pereira (1990) argues that this constraint is best formulated as a condition on semantic
derivations rather than as a condition on the syntax of logical expressions.
14This is one of the reasons for preferring a semantic account of ambiguity to a syntactic
account which makes ambiguity depend on the existence of two distinct logical forms.
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(6) The first thing that strikes a stranger in New York is a big car.
The joke relies on two assumptions about human processing: first, that the
clause the first thing that strikes a stranger in New York gets interpreted before
the end of the sentence, with strikes receiving the ‘surprise’ interpretation; and
second, that the reader, upon reading is a big car, will go back, produce a
second interpretation, and entertain both interpretations simultaneously. The
joke could not be understood unless the hearer were able to entertain the two
interpretations of the sentence simultaneously. These jokes can exploit other
forms of ambiguity, e.g., scopal ambiguity, as in Statistics show that every 11
seconds a man is mugged here in New York City. We are here today to interview
him.
The reader’s ability to entertain more than one interpretation simultaneously
is exploited in poetry, as well (Su , 1994). The linguistic articles discussing
ambiguity are another literary form that exploits this possibility. Examples
such as They saw her duck are a clear case of deliberate ambiguity; the whole
point of these examples is to show that a sentence can have more than one
interpretation. The writer relies on the reader being able to entertain more
than one interpretation at once.
The opposite is true, as well: when clarity is a goal, writers and speakers tend
to construct their sentences in such a way as to avoid ambiguity. Thus, most
sentences one runs across in scientific texts or in transcripts of task-oriented
conversations have a clearly preferred interpretation. This interpretation is
sometimes suggested by the context, sometimes by means of disambiguation
markers—expressions such as each, a different, or the same that suggest which
interpretation is preferred. Thus, a writer will use sentences such as Every kid
climbed the same tree, rather than Every kid climbed a tree, when we/she wants
to make sure that the reader arrives at the interpretation in which there is a
single tree.15
I will call the situation in which a listener arrives at more than one in-
terpretation for an utterance perceived ambiguity. A situation in which B
perceives an utterance as ambiguous may result in B’s appreciating the joke,
the poetic phrase, or the point of the linguistic example; if the ambiguity is
not perceived as intended, B may say saying something like This is not very
clear, or perhaps This sentence is ambiguous. This situation can be informally
characterized as follows:
Definition 2.3 An utterance U by conversational participant A addressing con-
versational participant B in a discourse situation D is perceived as ambigu-
ous in D by B if B’s processing of U in D results in B obtaining distinct
interpretations for U.
15Such sentences are used, for example, to get a ’baseline’ interpretation in psychological
work on ambiguity.
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The phenomenon of deliberate ambiguity suggests that the solution to the
Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle cannot be that humans either generate only
one interpretation at a time by using some clever heuristics, or do not generate
any interpretation at all. Humans entertain more than one interpretation at a
time, and they may not be able to choose one among them. This conclusion
is also supported by psychological results. There is evidence, for example, that
during both lexical processing and syntactic processing several hypotheses are
generated in parallel, and only later filtered on the basis of contextual informa-
tion (Swinney , 1979; Crain and Steedman , 1985; Kurtzman , 1985; Schubert
, 1986; Gibson , 1991).16 Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993) suggest a similar
model for scope disambiguation. As far as reference interpretation is concerned,
there is some evidence that all pragmatically available referents become active
before a referent is identified (see, e.g., (Spivey-Knowlton et al. , 1994)).
These facts are consistent with the view of discourse interpretation taken in
Artificial Intelligence, in which processes such as reference resolution or lexical
disambiguation are modeled in terms of defeasible inference, which may result in
alternative hypotheses. Examples include the theories of the effects of semantic
priming on lexical disambiguation, as formalized, e.g., in Hirst’s ABSITY system
(Hirst , 1987) or, more recently, in statistically based terms; the theories about
the effects of local focusing on the choice of pronoun antecedents such as (Grosz
et al. , 1983); the work on temporal interpretation by Asher, Lascarides, and
Oberlander (see, e.g., (Lascarides et al. , 1992)); and work on scopal disam-
biguation such as (Kurtzman and MacDonald , 1993; Poesio , 1994).
2.4 Semantic Ambiguity versus Perceived Ambiguity
A preliminary and, I hope, uncontroversial conclusion I intend to draw from the
discussion on deliberate ambiguity and ambiguity processing is that a theory
of ambiguity that aims at explaining the Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle needs
to be concerned both with the interpretation that the grammar assigns to a
sentence—i.e., what it means for a sentence to be semantically ambiguous—and
with the process by which interpretations are generated, i.e., with what it means
for an utterance to be perceived as ambiguous. On the one hand, the theory
must explain why the disambiguation process will not generate all semantically
available interpretations; on the other hand, it must predict that more than
one interpretation will be generated. This conclusion is the central idea of
this paper, indeed, what gives the paper its title. The inclusion of a theory of
disambiguation will also remedy one of the omissions in Pinkal’s theory, namely,
how to formalize the Precisification Imperative.
The discussion of perceived ambiguity supports a stronger claim, namely,
that semantic ambiguity and perceived ambiguity are distinct notions, in the
16The results about lexical disambiguation are fairly well established, but there is some
controversy about syntactic processing. A constrasting view on syntactic disambiguation is
discussed in (Frazier and Fodor , 1978).
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sense that whereas a model of semantic ambiguity has to express the truth-
conditional properties of an expression, the reasoning processes involved in dis-
ambiguation, and that may lead to a perceived ambiguity, consist of defeasible
inferences that are not supported by the semantics of ambiguous expressions.
The distinction I intend to draw, then, is as follows. Semantic ambiguity
is part of the specification of the grammar of a language; most, if not all, sen-
tences are semantically ambiguous, but their ambiguity need not be noticed by
listeners, and in fact it is typically discovered only by linguistic research. Per-
ceived ambiguity, on the other hand, is a result of the interpretation process,
that is defeasible in nature, and may therefore result in more than one interpre-
tation in cases of miscommunication or when the speaker constructs the context
appropriately to serve a rhetorical purpose, as in the puns presented above.
Some readers may wonder why the developer of a NLP system should be
concerned with perceived ambiguity, i.e., with generating all of the contextually
available interpretations of a sentence. The answer is that certain applications
need this information. Consider the following example, again from the TRAINS
domain. Say that the user utters move the engine to Avon, and say that two
different engines have been discussed during the elaboration of the current part
of the plan. Clearly, we do not want the system to just come out with a plau-
sible guess about which engine was meant: instead, we want it to recognize the
ambiguity and ask for clarification. In general, all systems that engage in con-
versations with their users need to be able to recognize an ambiguity, to ask for
clarifications when necessary rather than guess one possible interpretation, and
to make their own output unambiguous. (Of course, the theory of contextual
disambiguation must be such that no spurious ambiguities are obtained.)
3 The Underspecification Hypothesis
All theories of semantic interpretation based on Montague’s general program as
exposed in Universal Grammar (Montague , 1970) assume that the grammar of
a language L specifies two homomorphisms: one between syntactic trees and a
disambiguated language DL, and a second one between the disambiguated
language and objects of the model M (the senses). These two homomorphisms
can be composed, thus making the intermediate level of the disambiguated lan-
guage dispensable. The grammar assigns to an ambiguous expression of L dis-
tinct expressions of DL, each of which has a unique interpretation.
A direct implementation of this strategy in an NLP system would require
generating all senses of an ambiguous sentence-string, which would be clearly
problematic. Many NLP systems, instead, make use of heuristic methods that
generate only one interpretation and ignore the alternatives. These heuristics
work fairly well fairly often; such systems, however, won’t be able to perceive
an ambiguity even when it would be helpful to do so. Other systems therefore
split the semantic problem of computing all the interpretations of a sentence
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from the processing problem of generating these interpretations in context, by
making use of an intermediate, underspecified level of representation. One
of the earliest examples of underspecified representations is the ‘Logical Form’
of Schubert and Pelletier (1982). The representation for (7) proposed by Schu-
bert and Pelletier, shown in (8), is a typical example of these underspecified
representations: quantifiers are left in place and the referent for the definite
description the tree is not specified.
(7) Every kid climbed the tree.
(8) [<every kid> climbed <the tree >]
In more recent years, underspecified representations similar to Schubert and
Pelletier’s have been used by (Hobbs and Shieber , 1987), Fenstad et al. (1987),
in Allen’s textbook (1987) and, most recently, in the Core Language Engine
(Alshawi , 1992); the ‘uninterpreted conditions’ produced during the interme-
diate steps of the DRT construction algorithm in (Kamp and Reyle , 1993) can
be considered underspecified representations as well.
Underspecified representations were originally conceived as a way to solve
a problem in system implementation, namely, separating ‘context-independent’
from ‘context dependent’ aspects of the interpretation, thus making either part
reusable for different applications. Since the motivation was strictly computa-
tional, the underspecified representations used in most NLP systems are little
more than data structures, in the sense that they do not have a interpreta-
tion other than the one provided by the procedures that interpret them. These
representations ‘encode’ the ambiguity of a sentence in the sense that that sen-
tence has the reading r iff that reading can be generated by repeatedly applying
‘construction rules’ to the underspecified representation.
In recent years, there has been growing interest for the hypothesis that the
ability to encode multiple interpretations in an underspecified language may be
(part of) the explanation of the Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle. The idea is
that humans, as well, make use of an underspecified language that can encode
distinct meanings implicitly, and therefore do not need to generate all of these
meanings. A semantically ambiguous sentence, therefore, need not cause prob-
lems for a human to process, because it is not necessarily perceived as ambiguous
in the sense discussed in the previous section. I will call this assumption the
Underspecification Hypothesis:
Underspecification Hypothesis : Human beings represent semantic ambi-
guity implicitly by means of underspecified representations that
leave some aspects of interpretation unresolved.
My goal in the rest of the paper is to spell out the Underspecification Hypothesis
both as a theory of grammar and as a theory of discourse interpretation. I
assume, that is, that the hypothesis is correct, and try to answer questions such
as: what kind of language are underspecified representations? what is their
semantics? and, what kind of inferences are done with them?
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The novel aspect of this work is that the answers I give are based on the dis-
cussion of semantic ambiguity and perceived ambiguity in the previous section.
I hypothesize that underspecified representations are used by humans as the
translation of expressions that are indefinite in the sense of Pinkal, and assign
them a semantics that reflects this hypothesis. I assume that the disambigua-
tion process is consists of defeasible inferences, and examine the characteristics
of defeasible reasoning with underspecified representations. Although the same
position towards disambiguation and defeasible has been adopted in the Core
Language Engine, most of the issues I discuss have not been mentioned so far
in the discussion on underspecified representations.
In the literature on underspecification, one often finds the argument that
providing a semantics to underspecified representations is necessary because
disambiguation requires inference, and therefore a ‘logic of underspecification’ is
needed (Poesio , 1991; Reyle , 1993; van Deemter , 1991). However, it is not at all
clear whether the process of disambiguation involves much semantically justified
reasoning; disambiguation seems to consist mostly of defeasible inferences. It is
fair to say that the debate on this issue is very open at the moment, as certified
by a number of recent panels on the subject. But whatever the final conclusion
on this topic will be, it is clear that under the perspective that the grammar of
a language L is a mapping from elements of L to underspecified representations,
the semantics of these underspecified representations becomes a central aspect
of the specification of the grammar. Furthermore, it also becomes clear that
the semantics of underspecified representations must be based on an analysis
of semantic ambiguity, otherwise we wouldn’t even know whether the form of
underspecified representation we develop does the job it is supposed to do.
4 An Underspecified Theory of Ambiguity, Part
I: Lexical Ambiguity
The simplest way to illustrate my implementation of the Underspecification
Hypothesis is to start with lexical ambiguity. I present in this section a the-
ory of grammar which makes use of an underspecified language to encode the
‘ambiguity potential’ of lexically ambiguous expressions, as well as a simple for-
malization of lexical disambiguation as defeasible inference over underspecified
representations. In the next section I will show how to extend the approach
presented here to deal with expressions that exhibit other forms of semantic
ambiguity.
I want to emphasize that I start with lexical disambiguation for expository
purposes only. Lexical ambiguity is the one case of ambiguity for which a ‘gen-
erate and test’ strategy may well be compatible with the psychological results,
therefore the one for which the need for underspecified representations is less
clear. Furthermore, I will only discuss cases of lexical ambiguity in the nar-
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row sense, which is perhaps the least interesting case of lexical indefiniteness.
Discussing lexical disambiguation, however, is the simplest way to explain how
underspecified representations can be given a semantics related to Pinkal’s pro-
posals about ambiguity, and how to defeasible reasoning with underspecified
representations. In the next sections I will generalize the approach introduced
here to cases of ambiguity for which the underspecified approach is much more
plausible. Furthermore, at least one theory of lexical disambiguation, Hirst’s
proposal (1987), makes use of ‘Polaroid words’ which are essentially underspec-
ified interpretations of lexical items.
4.1 A Lexically Underspecified Grammar
The presentation of a lexically underspecified grammar below is centered on the
example of (H-type) lexical ambiguity discussed above, the verb croak, which
can take two precisifications. Let L be the language which consists of the single
sentence Kermit croaked. This sentence is H-type ambiguous because it ad-
mits of two precisifications and it is subject to the precisification imperative. A
‘Montagovian’ grammarMG would map (syntactic analyses of) the sentence into
distinct expressions of a ‘disambiguated language’ DL, each of which denotes
a function from discourse situations into intensional objects of the appropri-
ate type (in this case, propositions). A grammar UHG that subscribes to the
Underspecification Hypothesis, on the other hand, maps syntactic analyses of
expressions of L into a single expression of a ‘lexically underspecified language’
LXUL. The semantics of LXUL is based on the Precisification Principle: ex-
pressions of LXUL denote at each discourse situation a set of senses of the type
they would be assigned by a Montagovian grammar.17
The lexically underspecified language LXUL has the following ingredients:
Terms : the constant k.
Predicates: croakU , croak1, and croak2.
Atomic Formulas: If t is a term and P is a predicate, then P(t) is a formula.
Formulas: If Φ and Ψ are formulas, then ¬Φ and Φ ∧ Ψ are formulas.
Note that in addition to two predicates croak1 and croak2, corresponding
to the disambiguated senses of croak, the language includes an ‘underspecified’
predicate croakU . The interpretation function for LXUL, [[α]]
M,d, is defined
as follows. Let M = 〈U,F 〉 be a model just like the one that would be used for
a disambiguated language DL. The interpretation function [[α]]M,d assigns to
an expression α of LXUL a value with respect to M and a discourse situation
d.
17The technique of assigning sets of senses as the denotation of sentences dates back at least
to Hamblin (1973), who used it to extend Montague’s fragment to questions.
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• [[k]]M,d = {fk}, where fk : s → the denotation of ‘Kermit’ in s
• [[croak1]]
M,d = {f1}, where f1 is a function such that f1(s) → the set of
croaking objects in s
• [[croak2]]
M,d = {f2}, where f2 is a function such that f2(s) → the set of
dying objects in s}
• [[croakU ]]
M,d = {f1, f2}
• [[P(t)]]M,d = {f | for a g ∈ [[P]]M,d and an h ∈ [[t]]M,d f(s) = g(s)[h(s)] }
• [[Φ ∧ Ψ]]M,d = {f | for a g ∈ [[P]]M,d and an h ∈ [[t]]M,d, f(s) = 0 if g(s)
= 0 or h(s) = 0; f(s) = 1 if both g(s) = 1 and h(s) = 1 }
• [[¬Φ]]M,d = {f | for g ∈ [[Φ]]M,d, f(s) = 1 if g(s) = 0; f(s) = 0 if g(s) = 1 }
The language LXUL has been deliberately kept simple to make it clear that the
underspecified languages I propose have two basic properties: (i) the value of an
expression at a discourse situation is a set of senses of the type that a sense of
that expression would have in a disambiguated languageDL; and (ii) expressions
can be divided into expressions whose denotation at a discourse situation is
a singleton set, such as k or croak1, and expressions such as croakU that
denote a non-singleton set. The latter expressions provide the interpretation for
ambiguous expressions of L.18
The clauses for application and the connectives show how ambiguity ‘perco-
lates up’ from lexical items. The value of an expression like α(β) is obtained by
taking the cross-product of the values of α and β, and it includes one function f
per distinct pair of functions 〈α1,β1〉 in the denotations of α and β. The value
assigned by the function f to the situation s is defined by applying a certain
operation (in this case, application) to the values assigned to s by the functions
α1 and β1. Thus, if both the denotation of α and the denotation of β are sin-
gleton sets, the denotation of α(β) is also a singleton set; otherwise, ambiguity
‘multiplies,’ as it where.19 The same ‘multiplication’ technique is also used to
18A lexical item can also be ambiguous in that it may be associated with lexical entries of
different syntactic categories: for example, the word duck can either be interpreted as a noun
or as an verb, as shown by the example They saw her duck. I assume a syntactic ambiguity in
these cases, i.e., I assume that the grammar would assign two syntactic analyses to the word
duck, each of which would then get an interpretation in LXUL.
19It is perhaps worth emphasizing a difference between the semantics just sketched and
virtually all other approaches to underspecification I am aware of. In this proposal, the
underspecified language LXUL does not serve as a ‘meta-language’ to be given a semantics
in terms of the values assigned to the expressions of a ‘disambiguated language’; instead, it
has a semantics of its own, defined bottom-up much in the way the semantics of DL would
be defined. In other words, the approach just sketched does not rely on the assumption
that a ‘disambiguated language’ can be defined, which, at the light of Pinkal’s treatment of
indefiniteness, appears to be questionable. For example, for Pinkal an expression is ‘purely
vague’ is no natural precisification exists.
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define the denotation of connectives.20
The following grammar generates an underspecified representation of Ker-
mit croaked by mapping the semantically ambiguous predicate croaked into an
‘ambiguous’ predicate of LXUL as follows:
• S → NP VP; VP′(NP′)
• NP → Kermit; k
• VP → croaked; croakU
The underspecified translation of Kermit croaked in LXUL, croakU (k), denotes
a set of two propositions at a situation d: the function that assigns 1 to a
situation iff Kermit produced a frog-like sound in that situation, and the function
that assigns 1 to a situation iff Kermit died in that situation. This makes the
sentence indefinite in Pinkal’s sense.21 By contrast, an indeterminate sentence
such as Kermit is the Ruritanian secretary of state would have a single sense at
a given discourse situation.
Pinkal’s Precisification Imperative is an attempt at making more precise the
observation that human beings don’t seem to have good intuitions concerning
what follows from a H-type ambiguous sentence. Even when subjects are able
to pass judgments about what follows from an ambiguous sentence, it’s arguable
that they do not give judgments concerning what follows from the underspec-
ified representation: rather, they first generate one interpretation, then decide
what follows from that. The conclusion that I would be inclined to draw is
that a relation of semantic entailment capturing human intuitions can only be
defined, if at all, between expressions whose interpretation is not subject to
the Precisification Imperative. So, although it would be possible to define, for
example, a ‘strong’ notion of entailment as what follows from all senses, this
definition would be rather artificial. For this reason I will not attempt to define
a notion of entailment between expressions of LXUL; the readers interested in
the issue are referred to Pinkal’s book and to the discussion in van Deemter’s
dissertation (1991).
4.2 Discourse Interpretation and Perceived Ambiguity
20I will ignore in what follows the issue of partiality, e.g., what happens when a conjunct
has a value other than 0 or 1.
21The denotation assigned to an indefinite sentence by the grammar above is a simplification
of the denotation that Pinkal would assign to such a sentence in (Pinkal , 1995), which, in
addition the set of senses associated with a natural language expression, would also include
a partial order relation of precisification between them. Such an order relation plays an
important role in the meaning of vague sentences such as Kermit is tall is considered, which
has distinct senses depending on the degree of precision with which the discourse situation is
specified, but a less important one in the cases of ‘narrow sense’ ambiguity with which I am
concerned here.
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4.2.1 Discourse Interpretation and Defeasible Reasoning
A theory of ambiguity processing solves the Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle if
it does not require that all distinct interpretations of a semantically ambiguous
sentence are actually generated. A grammar consistent with the Underspecifi-
cation Hypothesis such as the one just discussed moves us one step towards that
goal, since it only imposes the constraint that a single underspecified interpre-
tation be generated.
On the other hand, we can conclude from the discussion of deliberate ambi-
guity and of the psychological work on ambiguity that a psychologically plau-
sible theory of ambiguity must also predict that more than one interpretation
may become available in a given context, although the number of such interpre-
tations will in general be much smaller than the number of possible semantic
interpretations.
As discussed above, the view of discourse interpretation that I am going to
take is the one typically found in the AI literature, according to which disam-
biguation involves the generation of (possibly distinct) hypotheses in parallel
by means of defeasible inference. This perspective is found, for example, in the
work on abductive discourse interpretation by Hobbs and colleagues (Hobbs et
al. , 1990), in the work on Bayesian disambiguation by, e.g., Charniak and his
students (Charniak and Goldman , 1988) and in the work on DICE and dis-
course interpretation by Asher, Lascarides, and Oberlander (Lascarides et al.
, 1992). Some of the formal models of defeasible reasoning that can be used
to formalize the situation in which conflicting hypotheses are generated include
Reiter’s default logic (Reiter , 1980), the abductive model (Hobbs et al. ,
1990), Bayesian Nets, and DICE (Lascarides et al. , 1992; Asher and Morreau ,
1991).
4.2.2 Lexical Disambiguation Using Defaults
As a model of defeasible reasoning, I adopt Reiter’s Default Logic. In default
logic, the process that generates defeasible hypotheses is seen as the compu-
tation of the extensions of a default theory (D,W) where D is a set of
default inference rules and W is a set of formulas. I will formalize discourse in-
terpretation as the process of generating the extensions of the theory (DI,UF),
where DI—the Discourse Interpretation Principles—are default infer-
ence rules, and UF is a set of expressions of an underspecified language like
LXUL. Let us ignore for the moment the fact that the formulas in UF are un-
derspecified representations. The Discourse Interpretation Principles formalize
the defeasible inferences that take place in discourse interpretation, such as dis-
ambiguating inferences. These rules are operations that map a set of wffs that
allow of a certain number of interpretations into a new set of wffs with a more
restricted number of interpretations. An example of Discourse Interpretation
Principle is the following:
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CROAK1-IF-FROG:
croakU (x) ∧ frog(x) : croak1(x)
croak1(x)
This inference rule22 reads: if the set of wffs UF includes the fact that the
object x has the property croakU and the property frog, and if it is consistent
to assume that the interpretation croak1 of croakU was intended, then the
inference rule CROAK1-IF-FROG produces a new set of wffs that includes
the fact croak1(x). The application of CROAK1-IF-HUMAN-LIKE would be
blocked by the presence in UF of the wff ¬croak1(k). Using Reiter’s definition
of extension in an ‘intuitive’ fashion, we can see that the default theory
({CROAK1-IF-FROG}, {croakU (k) ∧ frog(k)})
has the following (unique) extension:
{croakU (k) ∧ frog(k), croak1(k)}
The denotation of a set of wffs {Φ1 . . . Φn} will be defined as the denotation of
the conjunction Φ1 ∧ . . .∧ Φn of these wffs. I also assume that the empty set
of wffs denotes the function TRUE that is true at every situation. With this
definition, and under the assumption that each ‘unambiguous’ interpretation
of the word croak is incompatible with the others (i.e., under the assumption
that croak1(x ) ⊢ ¬croak2(x )), the extension of (DF,UI) admits of only one
denotation, the one under which the denotation of k produced a sound like the
one frogs produce.23
A default theory always has an extension as long as all defaults are normal,24
but it may have more than one extension if the set of Discourse Interpretation
Principles contains two inference rules that both apply but generate a conflict.
Consider, for example, the default theory consisting of a set of discourse in-
terpretation principles DI′ that includes, in addition to CROAK1-IF-FROG,
a second discourse interpretation principle (let’s call it CROAK2-IF-HUMAN-
LIKE) stating that the croak2 interpretation is plausible for human-like beings;
and of a set of wffs UF′ including the fact that Kermit is a human-like being.
({CROAK1-IF-FROG,CROAK2-IF-HUMAN-LIKE},
{croakU (k) ∧ frog(k), human-like(k) })
this theory would have two extensions:
1. {croakU (k) ∧ frog(k), human-like(k), croak1(k)}
2. {croakU (k) ∧ frog(k), human-like(k), croak2(k)}
22CROAK1-IF-FROG is an open inference rule. Such rules act like inference rule schemas.
23See the discussion below.
24I.e., of the form α:β/ β.
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Perceived ambiguity can now be redefined more precisely as the state that
obtains when the default theory ‘encoding’ the listener’s discourse interpretation
processes has more than one extension; and the cases of deliberate ambiguity
discussed in section §2 can be formalized as cases in which the speaker has
‘reasoned about the other agent’s reasoning,’ as it were.
4.2.3 Constraints on Discourse Interpretation and the Anti-Random
Hypothesis
Once we start allowing discourse interpretation processes like those just dis-
cussed, the Underspecification Hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the Com-
binatorial Explosion Puzzle anymore. The UH does not rule out a theory of
discourse interpretation in which after an underspecified interpretation has been
obtained, all possible senses of a sentence are generated. In fact, a lot of NLP
systems work this way, as well as interpretation procedures such as Hobbs and
Shieber’s scoping algorithm (Hobbs and Shieber , 1987). In the framework for
discourse interpretation just presented, theories of this kind could be formalized
by including discourse interpretation principles that generate all the semanti-
cally justified interpretations at random. For the case of lexical disambiguation,
for example, we could have a theory that includes the two following inference
rules:
CROAK1-AT-RANDOM:
croakU (x): croak1(x)
croak1(x)
CROAK2-AT-RANDOM:
croakU (x): croak2(x)
croak2(x)
A theory of lexical disambiguation of this kind would simply produce all
semantically justified interpretations of a sentence, and the Combinatorial Ex-
plosion Puzzle would remain a puzzle. To solve the puzzle, a theory of disam-
biguation must therefore supplement the Underspecification Hypothesis with
constraints on discourse interpretation that ensure that only a few extensions
are generated.
The constraints need not be the same for all classes of ambiguity. For cer-
tain classes of ambiguity, including perhaps lexical ambiguity,25 the explanation
may simply be that the disambiguation process is incremental, i.e., it takes place
as the text is processed word by word or constituent by constituent, and each
ambiguity is resolved locally; in this way, only a small number of alternative
hypotheses have to be considered every time. For other classes of ambiguity,
25See however (Hirst , 1987).
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however, such as scopal ambiguity and referential ambiguity, incremental pro-
cessing does not seem to be the solution,26 and different constraints must apply.
In (Poesio , 1994), the following constraint was proposed:
Anti-Random Hypothesis (Informal) Humans do not randomly generate
alternative interpretations of an ambiguous sentence; only those few inter-
pretations are obtained that (i) are consistent with syntactic and semantic
constraints and (ii) are suggested by the context.
The Anti-Random Hypothesis should be thought of as a ‘meta-constraint’ on
theories of interpretation: if we intend to account for the Combinatorial Explo-
sion Puzzle, we have to develop theories of interpretation (e.g., theories of pars-
ing, or theories of definite description interpretation) that satisfy this constraint,
i.e., in which discourse interpretation principles like CROAK1-AT-RANDOM
and CROAK2-AT-RANDOM are not allowed.
In order to illustrate more concretely the difference between theories of dis-
course interpretation that satisfy the Anti-Random Hypothesis, and theories
that do not, let us consider how one could formalize a theory of pronominal in-
terpretation. A ‘random’ theory of pronoun interpretation would go as follows:
first, compute all possible antecedents of the pronoun in the discourse. Then,
generate an hypothesis for each of them, stating that the pronoun refers to that
antecedent. Finally, rank these hypotheses according to their plausibility. A
random hypothesis generation process usually leaves the task of choosing one
hypothesis to plan recognition; the problem is that most often, the alternatives
are equally plausible.
In contrast, centering theory (Grosz et al. , 1983) is an example of non-
random pronoun interpretation theory. According to centering theory, each
utterance establishes a ‘backward looking center’ (Cb), and a pronoun is by de-
fault interpreted to refer to the Cb. (I am glossing over a number of complexities
here.) Such a theory would generate a single (or a few) hypothesis concerning the
antecedent of a pronoun; the other possibilities, although semantically possible,
would simply never come up. Examples of theories of definite description inter-
pretation, tense interpretation, the interpretation of modals in discourse, and
26In a sentence such as John gave a present to each child, for example, the indefinite a
present takes narrow scope with respect to the quantifier each child. The interpretation of the
sentence must therefore either remain partially underspecified until the quantifier is processed,
or be revised when the quantifier is encountered. Similarly, when processing a sentence such
as John always invites MARY to the movies, whose preferred interpretation is that whenever
John goes to the movies, he invites Mary, the restriction of the adverb of quantification always
is not encountered until the PP to the movies is encountered.
There is little doubt that part of the solution to the Combinatorial Explosion Puzzle is
that some forms of ambiguity, at least, are solved locally and incrementally. Garden-path
phenomena, for example, are commonly interpreted as providing evidence for this hypothesis
(Frazier and Fodor , 1978; Crain and Steedman , 1985; Altmann , 1989), and, as discussed
above, similar effects can exploit forms of ambiguity other than syntactic ambiguity: e.g.,
scopal ambiguity. The examples just discussed suggest however that an incremental account
of discourse interpretation, as well, must be supplemented with a theory of underspecification.
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scope disambiguation that satisfy the Anti-Random Hypothesis are discussed in
(Poesio , 1994).
The Anti-Random Hypothesis can be made more formal in the framework for
discourse interpretation adopted here by introducing a slightly different syntax
for default inference rules, one in which the underspecified condition is syntacti-
cally separated from additional contextual requirements such as the requirement
in CROAK1-IF-FROG that the object in question be a frog:
CROAK1-IF-FROG
croakU (x ) : frog(x ) : croak1(x )
croak1(x )
Except for the fact that one of the prerequisite wffs is ‘singled out’, an inference
rule thus rewritten has the same interpretation as one of Reiter’s default rules.
We can then require the contextual requirements to be non-trivial (i.e., not
satisfied in every situation) as follows:
Anti-Random Hypothesis A discourse interpretation theory (DI,UF) isAnti-
Random iff for all discourse interpretation principles α:β:δ/ γ in DI, β is
not satisfied in every situation.
4.2.4 The Condition on Discourse Interpretation
The framework just introduced can also be used to formalize the ‘second order’
aspects of Pinkal’s theory, such as the Precisification Imperative. The Precisi-
fication Imperative can be seen as imposing a constraint on the extensions of
a discourse interpretation theory, namely, as the requirement that extensions
include a ‘disambiguating wff’ like croak1(k) for each H-type ambiguous con-
stituent of the set UF such as croakU (k). I will call this constraint Condition
on Discourse Interpretation. In first instance, the Condition on Discourse
Interpretation might be formulated as follows, for the case of lexical ambiguity:
Condition on Discourse Interpretation (Preliminary): Each
extension E of a discourse interpretation theory (DI,UF) must include, for
each literal L in UF whose predicate is H-type ambiguous, a distinct dis-
ambiguating literal, i.e., a literal whose denotation is a single function
among those in the denotation of L.
The definition of the Condition on Discourse Interpretation just given is not
very general: it depends on the assumption that all cases of H-type ambigu-
ity are originated by predicates. A simpler, and more general, formulation of
the Condition on Discourse Interpretation can be obtained by generalizing the
format for the discourse interpretation principles once more.
Default inference rules are typically used to augment a set of wffs with addi-
tional facts inferred by default: the fact that a particular bird flies, for example.
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But the purpose of discourse interpretation rules used for disambiguation, like
CROAK1-IF-FROG, is to restrict the interpretation by eliminating certain read-
ings. In this perspective, leaving the underspecified wffs around doesn’t make
much sense. I propose therefore to allow discourse interpretation principles to
rewrite their ‘triggering wff’ whenever this wff encodes an H-type ambiguity, in
addition to adding new wffs to a set. The more general format for discourse
interpretation principles is as follows:
α : β : δ
σ : τ
A rule of this form is an operation from sets of wffs into sets of wffs that given
a set W of wffs containing α and β and not containing ¬δ,27 produces a set
W′ of wffs containing τ , and in which α has been replaced by σ. I will call
α the triggering condition. For example, a version of CROAK1-IF-FROG
in which the triggering condition croakU (x ) is rewritten by the consequent
croak1(x ) is as follows:
CROAK1-IF-FROG
croakU (x ) : frog(x ) : croak1(x )
croak1(x ) :
If all disambiguation rules are rewritten in this format, a completely disam-
biguated extension can simply be characterized as one which doesn’t contain
any H-type ambiguous wffs. The notion of H-type ambiguous wff can be
characterized either syntactically (by identifying certain syntactic constituents
as specifying H-type ambiguity, and by classifying as H-type ambiguous a wff
that contains one of these constituents)28 or model-theoretically, e.g., by means
of a function ι such that if X is a set of senses, ι(X) is 1 if the set of senses is
admissible, 0 if it is inadmissible in Pinkal’s sense. Whatever way we choose to
define a H-type ambiguous wff, the Condition on Discourse Interpretation can
now be formulated as follows:
Condition on Discourse Interpretation : An extension E of a discourse
interpretation theory (DI,UF) cannot contain an H-type ambiguous wff.
Notice that the statement of the Condition on Discourse Interpretation as a
condition on pragmatic reasoning gives it the status of a felicity condition rather
than of a hard constraint on interpretation.
27Strictly speaking, one should check that ¬δ does not occur in the extension itself, not
in the intermediate sets of wffs; this form makes sense however once we adopt a ‘syntactic’
definition of extension (see below).
28Both the treatment of scopal ambiguity and the treatment of referential ambiguity pro-
posed below are such that the constituents that introduce H-type ambiguity can be identified
syntactically.
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4.2.5 Extensions, closure and consistency checking in an underspec-
ified default theory
So far, I’ve been using the terminology from default logic as if the shift to
an underspecified representation had no side effects, but this is not the case.
Consider the way in which Reiter defines the notion of extension of a (closed)29
default theory, for example:
Definition 4.1 Let ∆ = (D,W) be a closed default theory, so that every default
of D has the form (α:β1,. . . , βm/w) where α,β1,. . . ,βm,w are all closed wffs of
L. For any set of closed wffs S ⊆ L let Γ(S) be the smallest set satisfying the
following three properties:
D1 W ⊆ Γ(S)
D2 Th(Γ(S)) = Γ(S)
D3 If (α:β1,. . . , βm/w) ∈ D and α∈ S and ¬β1, . . . , ¬βm ¬ ∈ S then w ∈
Γ(S).
A set of closed wffs E ⊆ L is an extension for ∆ iff Γ(E) = E, i.e., iff E is a
fixed point of the operator Γ.
This definition crucially relies on the notion of deductive closure Th(S), defined
as the set of wffs {w | S ⊢ w}; but what we said with semantic entailment
holds for provability, as well: no clear notion exists of what it means for an
expression of an underspecified language to follow from a set of wffs of the same
language. Two routes are open to us. One is to define a notion of ‘underspecified
provability’ ⊢U , and to use ⊢U to define an ‘underspecified’ notion of closure
ThU (S). For example, we could say that w ⊢U w
′ iff for each expression w′′ that
denotes a single one of the interpretations of w, w′′ ⊢U w
′. This route is not
very appealing, however, if for no other reason that it’s not clear that any way
of defining an underspecified notion of provability will do.
The alternative is to adopt a new notion of extension that does not rely on
deductive closure, i.e., one in which an extension is a fixed point of the operator
Γ′, which does not include condition D2 of the definition of Γ:
• Let Γ′(S) be the smallest set satisfying the following two properties:
D1 W ⊆ Γ′(S)
D3 If (α:β1,. . . , βm/w) ∈ D and α∈ S and ¬β1, . . . , ¬βm ¬ ∈ S then w
∈ Γ′(S).
29A closed default theory is one in which no default contains open variables. All really
interesting cases of default inference rules do include such variables; but Reiter derives the
definition of the extension of an ‘open’ default theory from the definition of extension for
closed theories.
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Replacing Γ with Γ′ in the definition of extension has several consequences.
First and foremost, dropping the requirement of deductive closure makes the
test of whether it is consistent to assume β1, . . . , βm essentially syntactic: i.e.,
it is possible for βj not to be included in Γ
′(S) even though it is derivable
from Γ′(S). (In general, this definition of extension is a much closer description
of the behavior of actual implementations of non-monotonic reasoning than
the original definition.) And therefore, a logic defined in this way does not
have the property of Reiter’s logic that a (closed) default theory (D,W) has an
inconsistent extension iff W is inconsistent.
In fact, each extension of a discourse interpretation theory under this new
definition will, in general, be H-type ambiguous, some of the interpretations be-
ing inconsistent. However, if we adopt the ‘rewriting’ version of disambiguation
discussed above, and impose the Condition on Discourse Interpretation, each
extension will have a single interpretation, and therefore its consistency can be
checked. I propose therefore to define the notion of extension of a discourse
interpretation theory as follows:
Extension: A set of closed wffs E ⊆ L is an extension for the discourse
interpretation theory ∆ iff E is a fixed point of the operator Γ′ and satisfies
the Condition on Discourse Interpretation.
5 Other Forms of Ambiguity
The theory of ambiguity introduced in the previous sections can be straightfor-
wardly extended to obtain a treatment of two other classes of semantic ambigu-
ity: scopal ambiguity and referential ambiguity. These extensions preserve the
basic ideas of the theory, semantic ambiguity as multiplicity of meanings, and
perceived ambiguity as multiple extensions of a default theory; what changes is
that on the one hand, a more complex underspecified language is introduced,
capable of encoding other forms of ambiguity; on the other hand, more complex
inference rules are used.
5.1 Scopal Ambiguity
I will call the sentence constituents that modify the parameters of evaluation,
and therefore affect the interpretation of other sentence constituents ‘in their
scope’, operators. Examples of operators are quantifiers (that affect the choice
of the variable assignment used to evaluate expressions in their scope) and
modals (that affect the choice of the world / situation at which expressions in
their scope are evaluated). As it is well-known, one cause of semantic ambiguity
is that sentences may contain more than one operator, and their relative scope
is not completely determined by the sentence’s syntactic structure. Sentences
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that have more than one meaning due to the interaction between operators are
called scopally ambiguous.30
Historically, most underspecified representations have been introduced to
deal with scopal ambiguity. Typically, an intermediate step of processing is
assumed in which operators are left ‘in place,’ as well as a subsequent step of
processing in which their relative scope is determined by contextual processing.
Schubert and Pelletier’s underspecified representation of Every kid climbed a
tree in (8) is an example of underspecified representation in which the operators
are left ‘in situ’.
These representations are typically justified in terms of ease of processing,
and their ability to represent ‘intermediate’ readings. It is clear however that
for the purposes of developing a ‘principled’ theory of ambiguity processing, it
would be much better to stick to as few new ‘levels of representation’ as possible.
In fact, there is no need to introduce a new level of representation. The two
requirements on a scopally underspecified representation—that it allow repre-
30‘Ambiguity elimination’ solutions to the combinatorial explosion puzzle, such as Kempson
and Cormack’s (1981) or Verkuyl’s (1992) have had some success in showing that certain cases
of ‘ambiguity’—especially ‘ambiguities’ associated with plural noun phrases or certain classes
of scopal ambiguities—are in fact cases of indeterminacy. Zwicky and Sadock noted that the
identity tests do not classify a sentence as ambiguous if the propositions expressed by the
sentence are such that one entails the other. This is the case, for instance, with sentences
such as (9) (Lakoff , 1970; Zwicky and Sadock , 1975; Kempson and Cormack , 1981).
(9) Every kid climbed a tree.
(Kempson and Cormack , 1981) claim that sentences like (10) are not ambiguous, but indeter-
minate: according to them, such sentences semantically denote the weaker reading (the one
in which the universal quantifier takes scope over the existential). The stronger reading is the
result of pragmatic reasoning.
(10) Every linguistics student has read a book by Chomsky.
Kempson and Cormack propose in fact that all quantified sentences denote a single propo-
sition; in this way, the combinatorial explosion puzzle disappears, at least as far as scopal
ambiguity is concerned. However, it is not true in general that a sentence with two quantifiers
has two interpretations, one of which entails the other. (11) does not have an interpretation
weak enough to be entailed by all others, yet able to capture the truth conditions correctly.
(11) Few students know many languages.
A second problem with the proposal of Kempson and Cormack is that if one wants to claim
that the meaning of a sentences such as (12a) is something like (12b), as Kempson and
Cormack do, then one ends up predicting that the meaning of (12c) should be something like
(12d), the strongest interpretation of the sentence. In other words, one either has to give
up compositionality for sentences like (12b), or to abandon the strategy of letting sentences
denote their weakest interpretation (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet , 1990).
(12) a. Every kid climbed a tree.
b. (∀ x kid(x) ⊃ (∃ y tree(y) ∧ climb(x,y)))
c. It is not the case that every kid climbed a tree.
d. ¬(∀ x kid(x) ⊃ (∃ y tree(y) ∧ climb(x,y)))
It should also be clear that whatever the case for scopal ambiguity, other kinds of ambiguity,
such as structural and H-type lexical ambiguity, cannot be reduced to indeterminacy.
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senting the structural information provided by a sentence, and representing the
intermediate steps of disambiguation—can be satisfied by using as an under-
specified representation the syntactic structure of the sentence, augmented with
information about the semantic interpretation of word-forms. In this way we can
also maintain semantic translation of lexical items used in Montague grammar,
that determine how they combine with other sentence constituents to determine
a sentence’s meaning.
The ‘lexically and scopally underspecified language’ LSUL I introduce to
encode scopal ambiguity generalizes the language LXUL introduced in the pre-
vious section by allowing for arbitrary functional types. In this way, the lexical
item every can be given its usual 〈〈e,t〉,〈〈e,t〉,t〉〉 translation:
λP. λQ. (∀ x: P(x) (Q(x))).
The second augmentation to LXUL is the inclusion of tree-like expressions used
to translate syntactic phrases. For example, the NP [NP [Det every] [N dog]]
translates into the expression:
[NP [Det λP. λQ. (∀ x: P(x) (Q(x)))] [N dog]]
The expression in (13) is the underspecified translation of the sentence Every
dog saw a frog:
(13)
S
NP VP
V NP
λQ. (∀ y: dog(y) (Q(y))) saw λP. (∃ x: frog(x) (P(x)))
Besides reducing the number of representations floating around, this was of
talking about scopal underspecification has two additional advantages over un-
derspecified representations in which all syntactic information except for the
position of operators is lost, such as Schubert and Pelletier’s underspecified log-
ical forms, Reyle’s underspecified DRSs or the Core Language Engine’s QLFs.
First of all, the semantics of expressions such as (13) —that, for historical
reasons, I call logical forms— can be computed in a completely classical
fashion using the storage mechanism (Cooper , 1983), with the result that syn-
tactic constraints on the available readings, such as the Scope Constraint (May
, 1985; Heim , 1982), can play a role in determining the semantics of these
objects, without the need for additional constraints such as the label ordering
constraints used in UDRS (Reyle , 1993). Secondly, all structural information is
preserved, not just information about the relative position of operators. Some of
this syntactic information is used as a clue during disambiguation, for example,
for interpreting pronouns, but also in certain theories of scopal disambiguation.
27
(See, e.g., (Kurtzman and MacDonald , 1993) and (Poesio , 1994) for an ac-
count of scope disambiguation which esploits the syntactic information encoded
by underspecified expressions such as (13).)
5.1.1 A Lexically and Scopally Underspecified Language
The semantics of the underspecified language LSUL is classically based on a set
T of semantic types, the smallest set such that (i) e and t are types; and (ii) If
τ and τ ′ are types, 〈τ ,τ ′〉 is a type. The set of meaningful expressions of type
α is indicated by MEα. The set of non-logical constant expressions of type α is
indicated as CEα ⊆ MEα.
The semantics of LSUL is based on the same idea as the semantics of LXUL.
Natural language expressions are assigned objects of the same type that they
would receive in (Dowty et al. , 1981) (as revised by Partee and Rooth (1983)),
with the difference that, when I talk about ‘meaningful expressions of type
τ ’ below, therefore, I am really talking about expressions that denote sets of
functions from the set of situations S to elements of Dτ (the domain of type
τ ). Thus for example, sentences are of type t both in Dowty, Wall and Peters’
system, and in the current proposal; but a meaningful expression of type t in
LSUL denotes a (function from a discourse situation to a) set of functions from
situations to truth values.
The sets of meaningful expressions of LSUL include all the expressions in
LXUL:
• CEe = {k}.
• CE〈e ,t〉 = {dog,frog,croakU , croak1, croak2 }.
(The language includes a single underspecified lexical interpretation, croakU .)
• CE〈e ,〈e,t〉〉 = {saw}.
• If α ∈ ME〈τ ,τ ′〉 and β ∈ MEτ , α(β) ∈ MEτ ′ .
• If α and β are of type t , then α ∧ β and ¬α are in MEt.
The set MEτ , for any type τ , includes a denumerably infinite set of variables
of type τ . LSUL also includes lambda-abstracts and quantified expressions, de-
fined below. The language also includes the new syntactic category of logical
forms. The sets of logical forms of syntactic category XP, LFXP , are defined
as follows:
• LFDet = {[Det α] | α ∈ ME〈〈e,t〉,〈〈e,t〉,t〉〉};
• LFN = {[N α] | α ∈ ME〈e,t〉};
• LFPN = {[PN α] | α ∈ CEe}
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• LFIV = { [IV α] | α ∈ ME〈e ,t〉};
• LFTV = {[TV α] | α ∈ ME〈e ,〈e,t〉〉};
• LFNP = {[NP α β] | α ∈ LFDet and β ∈ LFN }
∪ {[NP α] | α ∈ LFPN } ∪ {[NP α] | α a variable of type e }
• LFVP = {[VP α β] | α ∈ LFTV and β ∈ LFNP }
∪ {[VP α] | α ∈ LFIV }
• LFS = {[S α β] | α ∈ LFNP and β ∈ LFVP }
Meaningful expressions are assigned a value with respect to a universe U . I use
below the notation s to indicate that a ‘stands for’ an object in U , i.e., it is part
of the metalanguage, as opposed to being a meaningful expression of the object
language. The models with respect to which a CRT expression is evaluated
include a set S of situations. The only fact about situations I use here is that
they have constituents.
The interpretation of types with respect to U is defined as usual: De,U =
U ; Dt,U = {0,1}; D〈a,b〉,U = D
Da
b . In the rest of this paper, I generally drop
the indication of the universe (e.g., I write De instead of De,U ). The model of
interpretation for CRT expressions is the triple 〈U , S, I〉. The interpretation
function ‘I’ assigns an interpretation to constants of type τ .
The value of meaningful expressions is specified by a function [[.]]M,g,d that
includes an assignment function among its parameters, since the terms of LSUL
include variables. The interpretation of variables is specified by the following
clause:
• For α a variable of type τ , [[α]]M,g,d = the singleton set {g(α)}, where
g(α) is a constant function f : S → Dτ .
The interpretation of constants, connectives and application is as in LXUL.
The denotation of the other expressions is discussed below.
5.1.2 An Example of a Scopally and Lexically Underspecified Gram-
mar
The following grammar extends the grammar discussed in section §4 by adding
determiners and relations as new lexical items:
• PN → Kermit; k
• Det → every; λP. λQ. (∀ x: P(x) (Q(x)))
• Det → a; λP. λQ. (∃ x: P(x) (Q(x)))
• N → dog; dog
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• N → frog; frog
• IV → croaked; croakU
• TV → saw; saw
and by adding phrase structure rules for NPs and transitive verbs:
• S → NP VP; [S NP
′ VP′]
• NP → PN; [NP [PN PN
′]]
• NP → Det N; [NP [Det Det
′] [N N
′]]
• VP → IV; [VP [IV V
′]]
• VP → TV NP; [VP [TV V
′] NP′]
This grammar generates, in addition to lexically ambiguous sentences such as
Kermit croaked, scopally ambiguous sentences such as Every dog saw a frog.
5.1.3 The Denotation of Logical Forms
The denotation of logical forms is specified using the storage method, developed
by Robin Cooper as a way around a problem with Montague’s quantifying
in technique, namely, the fact that in order to get all the readings of a sco-
pally ambiguous sentence, one has to stipulate that the sentence is syntactically
ambiguous (see (Dowty et al. , 1981)).
Cooper proposed that the value of a syntactic tree is a set of sequences,
each sequence representing a distinct ‘order of application’ of the operators that
may result in a admissible interpretation of a sentence. For example, the quan-
tifier a frog can ‘enter’ the derivation of the VP saw a frog in two different ways.
The narrow scope reading is obtained by immediately applying the interpreta-
tion of the quantifier to the translation of saw; but it is also possible to apply
the predicate to the variable quantified over, and ‘wait’ before applying the
quantifier, in which case the wide scope reading is obtained. The value of the
NP a frog, then, is the set of two sequences shown in (14). One sequence consists
of a single element, the ‘traditional’ Montague-style translation of every frog.
The second sequence consists of two elements: the variable y, and the semantic
translation of the quantified NP, put ‘in storage’.
(14) {〈λP. (∃ y: frog(y) (P(y)))〉,
〈y, λP. (∃ y: frog(y) (P(y)))〉 }
Ambiguity ‘propagates up’ as follows. The value of the VP saw a frog in (15)
also consists of two sequences, one obtained by applying the first element of
the first sequence in the denotation of every frog to the predicate saw, the
other obtained by applying the predicate saw to the first element of the second
sequence (the variable y). The result is as in (16).
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(15) [VP [V saw] [NP λP. (∃ y: frog(y) (P(y)))]]
(16) {〈λx. (∃ y: frog(y) (saw(y)(x ))) 〉,
〈saw(y), λP. (∃ y: frog(y) (P(y))) 〉}
Finally, the value of a sentence is obtained by combining the value of the VP
with the value of the NP in the usual fashion: the value of [S Every dog saw
a frog] is a set of two sequences, each representing a distinct reading of the
sentence.
It’s easy to see that Cooper’s technique can be used to assign to underspec-
ified representations like (13) a ‘multiple sense’ denotation like those assigned
to lexically ambiguous expressions in the previous section. All that is needed is
a function CV that assigns to each expression of the form [XP α] its ‘Cooper
Value’; the denotation of sentence translations like [S β] can then be defined in
terms of CV as follows:
• If [S α] is a logical form in LES then [S α] is a meaningful expres-
sion of type t . Let CV(α)(M,g,d) be the set of single-element sequences
{〈{σ11 ,. . . ,σ1j}〉, . . . , 〈{σn1 ,. . . ,σnk}〉}. Then
[[[S α]]]
M,g,d = {σ11 ,. . . ,σ1j ,. . .σn1 ,. . . ,σnk}
(I have taken into account the fact that an expression of our underspecified lan-
guage denotes a set of objects, therefore each scopally disambiguated translation
of a sentence will still denote a set of propositions.)
Cooper discusses in detail in (Cooper , 1983) how semantic and syntactic
constraints on scope can be implemented as requirements that the storage be
‘discharged’ at certain positions—i.e., that no element in storage be ‘carried
across’ syntactic constructions that produce scope islands, such as S. In this
way, no operator in a clause may take scope over operators in an higher clause,
or in a sister clause, thus enforcing the Scope Constraint discussed in §2.2.31
The CV function used to define the interpretation of logical forms is based on
an implementation of the storage idea less general than Cooper’s, but simpler.
In order to arrive at a uniform specification of the Cooper Value of all constructs,
it is useful to define construct-specific versions of application in which to ‘bury’
the differences in storage manipulation. These operations are defined as follows:
31The definition of storage generates spurious readings in the case of embedded NPs such
as a representative of every company, that have to be eliminated via a separated filter (Keller
, 1988). Keller introduced a ‘nesting’ technique that obviates the problem (1988). More re-
cently, Pereira (Pereira , 1990) argued that the right scoping properties can be obtained with-
out additional stipulations from the natural deduction approach to parsing. I only consider
here ‘basic’ NPs that do not create problems for the simplest version of Cooper’s technique.
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• α{β}S =


α(β), if Type(α) = 〈〈e,t〉,t〉 and Type(β) = 〈e,t〉,
or if Type(α) = 〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 and Type(β) =
〈e,t〉.
λy. λx. β(x)(y){α}VP if Type(α) = 〈〈e,t〉,t〉 and
Type(β) = 〈e,〈e,t〉〉, or if Type(α) =
〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 and Type(β) = 〈e,〈e,t〉〉.
β(α), if Type(β) = 〈e,t〉 and Type(α) = e.
Undefined otherwise.
• α{β}VP =


α(β), if Type(α) = 〈e,t〉 and Type(β) = e.
λwe. β(α(we)), if Type(β) = 〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉
and Type(α) = 〈e,〈e,t〉〉.
λwe. β(λz. α(z )(we)), if Type(β) = 〈〈e,t〉,t〉
and Type(α) = 〈e,〈e,t〉〉.
Undefined otherwise.
• α{β}XP (where XP is a category other than S or VP) =


α(β), if Type(α) = 〈τ ,τ ′〉 and Type(β) = τ .
β(α), if Type(β) = 〈τ ,τ ′〉 and Type(α) = τ .
Undefined otherwise.
Next, we need an operation that combines two sets of sequences into one. The
result of applying this operation to two sets of sequences X and Y is the set of
sequences obtained by (typed) applying the first element of a sequence in X to
the first element of a sequence in Y and then merging the rest of the sequences,
as follows:
• X⊗YPY, where X and Y are the sets
X = {〈x11,x12, . . . x1m〉, . . . 〈xn1,xn2, . . . xnl〉} and
Y = {〈y11,y12, . . . y1p〉, . . . 〈yq1,yq2, . . . yqr〉},
and YP is any phrase category, is the set:
{ 〈xi1{yj1}YP, yj2, . . . yjp〉, xi2, . . . xim | 〈xi1,xi2, . . . xim〉 ∈ X and 〈yj1,yj2,
. . . yjp〉 ∈ Y }
We also need an operation to put operators into store, and one to ‘discharge’
them. The storeaway operation takes a set consisting a single single-element
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sequence and a result, and returns a set that consists of two sequences: the
original sequence, and a new sequence consisting of the result and the operator
in store.
• storeaway(α,X), where X = {〈β〉}, is {〈β〉,〈α,β〉}
The discharge operation takes a sequence and applies all operators back to
obtain a set of sequences with a single element and an empty store. For sim-
plicity, we will assume that all operators are generalised quantifiers, i.e., of type
〈〈e,t〉,t〉. (No other operators are specified in the grammar above.) discharge
is defined as follows:
• discharge(〈x1,x2, . . . xm〉) = {xm{ xm−1{. . . x2{x1}S}S }S }
discharge∗(X), where X is a set of sequences, is the union
⋃
x∈X discharge(x).
We can now specify the Cooper value of logical forms with respect to model M,
variable assignment g, and discourse situation d as follows:32
• CV([S [NP α] [VP β]]) = discharge
∗(CV([NP α]) ⊗SCV([VP β]))
• CV([NP [PN α]]) = CV([PN α])
• CV([NP [Det α] [N β]]) = storeaway(λQ. λz. Q(z), CV([Det α])⊗NPCV([N
β]))
• CV([NP α]) = {〈[[α]]
M,g,d〉}, where α is a variable of type e.
• CV([VP [IV α]]) = CV([IV α])
• CV([VP [TV α] [NP β]]) = CV([TV α]) ⊗VPCV([NP β])
• CV([PN PN
′]) = {〈[[PN′]]M,g,d〉}
• CV([Det Det
′]) = {〈[[Det′]]M,g,d〉}
• CV([IV IV
′]) = {〈[[IV′]]M,g,d〉}
• CV([TV TV
′]) = {〈[[TV′]]M,g,d〉}
• CV([N N
′]) = {〈[[N′]]M,g,d〉}
There are three tricky aspects to the definition of CV: the discharge operation
in the definition of the Cooper Value of a sentence translation, the definition of
CV([NP [Det α] [N β]]) in which an operator is put in store, and the definition of
CV([VP [V α] [NP β]] in which two stores are combined, and that has different
results depending on whether the NP is of type e or is a quantifier. I’ll illustrate
these cases by looking at the main steps of the computation of the CV of (13):
32Strictly speaking, the form CV(α)(M,g,d) should be used. I omit the indices below.
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1. CV([Det λP. λQ. (∃ y: P(y) (Q(y)))]) =
{〈λP. λQ. (∃ y: P(y) (Q(y)))〉}
(In what follows, I’ll use a to indicate the lexical translation of the deter-
miner a.)
2. CV([NP [Det a] [N frog]]) =
storeaway(λQ. λz. Q(z), CV([Det a]) ⊗NPCV([N frog])) =
{〈λQ. (∃ y: frog(y) (Q(y)))〉,
〈λQ. λz. Q(z), λQ. (∃ y: frog(y) (Q(y)))〉 }
(I’ll use [a frog] to stand for ′λQ. (∃ y: frog(y) (Q(y)))′ below.)
3. CV([VP [TV saw] [NP [Det a] [N frog]]]) =
CV([TV saw]) ⊗VPCV([NP [Det a] [N frog]]) =
{〈saw{[a frog]}VP〉, 〈saw{ λQ. λz. Q(z) }VP, [a frog]〉 } =
{〈λw. (∃ y: frog(y) (saw(y)(w)))〉,
〈λw. λx. saw(w)(x ), [a frog]〉 }
(Notice that the first element of the second sequence, in which [a frog] is
kept in store, is still of type 〈e,〈e,t〉〉.) I will use the abbreviations σ and
σ′ below for the first element of the first sequence and the first element of
the second sequence, respectively.
4. CV([NP [Det every] [N dog]]) =
{〈λQ. (∀ x: dog(x ) (Q(x)))〉,
〈λQ. λz. Q(z), λQ. (∀ x: dog(x ) (Q(x)))〉 }
(I’ll use [every dog] to stand for ′λQ. (∀ x: dog(x ) (Q(x)))′ below.)
5. CV([S [NP [Det every] [N dog]] [VP [V saw] [NP [Det a] [N frog]]]]) =
discharge∗(CV([NP α]) ⊗SCV([VP β])) =
discharge∗


{〈[every dog]{σ}S〉,
〈[every dog]{σ′}S, [a frog]〉,
〈 λQ. λz. Q(z){σ}S,[every dog]〉,
〈 λQ. λz. Q(z){σ′}S, [every dog], [a frog]〉}

 =
discharge∗


{〈 (∀ x: dog(x ) ( (∃ y: frog(y) ( saw(y)(x )))))〉,
〈λw. (∀ x: dog(x ) (saw(w)(x ))),[a frog]〉,
〈λz. (∃ y: frog(y) ( saw(y)(x ))),[every dog]〉,
〈λw. λz. saw(z )(w), [a frog],[every dog]〉 }

 =
{〈 (∀ x: dog(x ) ( (∃ y: frog(y) ( saw(y)(x )))))〉,
〈 (∃ y: frog(y) ( (∀ x: dog(x ) ( saw(y)(x )))))〉}
The Scope Constraint is enforced by requiring a complete discharge at the sen-
tential level, which means no operators can ‘move up’ outside the sentence in
which it occurs, although of course this couldn’t occur in this grammar since it
doesn’t cover relative clauses, sentential complements or coordination. I have
assumed that discharge only takes place at sentential level, i.e., there are no
operators taking scope over VPs; doing this would complicate matters a bit in
that a ‘partial’ discharge operation should be defined.
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5.1.4 Lambda Abstracts
Some care is required in the system developed here to get a semantics for
lambda-abstraction that preserves properties such as β- and η-reduction. The
clause specifying the denotation of lambda-abstraction in Dowty, Wall and Pe-
ters’s book is the following:
• If α is a variable of type τ and β a meaningful expression of type τ ′,
then λα.β is an expression of type 〈τ ,τ ′〉, and [[λα.β]]M,g,w,t is that func-
tion h: Dτ → Dτ ′ such that for all objects a in Dτ , h(a) is equal to
[[β]]M,g{α/a},w,t.
If we generalize this clause in the ‘obvious’ way we get:
• If α is a variable of type τ and β a meaningful expression of type τ ′, then
λα.β is an expression of type 〈τ ,τ ′〉, and [[λα.β]]M,g,d is the set {f | where
f: S → (Dτ → Dτ ′) and for all situations s, f(s) = h: Dτ → Dτ ′ , such that,
for all objects a in Dτ , h(a) is equal to h
′(s), for some h′ ∈ [[β]]M,g{α/a},d
}.
Lambda-abstraction defined in this way does not have the required properties.
To show that it does not preserve η-reduction,33 it is sufficient to consider the
following example: let S = {s1, s2}, Dτ = {a,b}, and let the expression β of
type 〈τ ,τ ′〉 have the following denotation:




s1 →
[
a → α1
b → β1
]
s2 →
[
a → α2
b → β2
]

,


s1 →
[
a → α3
b → β3
]
s2 →
[
a → α4
b → β4
]




Then [[β(α)]]M,g{α/a},d is as follows:{ [
s1 → α1
s2 → α2
]
,
[
s1 → α3
s2 → α4
] }
and [[β(α)]]M,g{α/b},dis as follows:
{ [
s1 → β1
s2 → β2
]
,
[
s1 → β3
s2 → β4
] }
Then, under the definition above, [[λα. β(α)]]M,g,d will contain the following
function, that is not part of the denotation of β (hence, η-reduction is not a
sound inference rule):
33I.e., that λα. β(α) 6= β.
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

s1 →
[
a → α1
b → β3
]
s2 →
[
a → α4
b → β2
]


Intuitively, the problem with the definition above is that it does not ‘preserve’
the functions in the denotation of β. A definition of lambda-abstraction that
does preserve these functions, and therefore preserves the soundness of β- and
η-reduction, can be obtained as follows.34
The denotation function [[α]]M,g,d used so far assigns a value to expression
α ∈ MEτ in model M with respect to the parameters of evaluation g and d,
[[α]]M,g,d ⊆ S → Dτ . Another way of specifying the value of expressions is to
define a function [[α]]M,d that assigns as value to α at discourse situation d a
set of functions of type (Ass → (S→ Dτ )), from assignments to functions in
(S→ Dτ ). For example, Dowty, Wall and Peters’ clause for lambda abstraction
could be rewritten as follows:
• If α is a variable of type τ and β a meaningful expression of type τ ′,
then λα.β is an expression of type 〈τ ,τ ′〉, and [[λα. β]] = Λ(α,[[β]]), where
Λ(α,Y) is that function f from Ass → (Dτ → Dτ ′) such that for all g ∈
Ass, s ∈ S, a in Dτ , f(g)(s)(a) = Y(g{α/a})(s).
This definition can then be generalized as follows:
• If α is a variable of type τ and β a meaningful expression of type τ ′, then
λα. β is an expression of type 〈τ ,τ ′〉, and [[λα. β]]M,d = Λ+(α,[[β]]), where
Λ+(α,Y) = {Λ(α,m) for some m ∈ Y} = {f ∈ (Ass → (S→ (Dτ → Dτ ′)))
such that for all g ∈ Ass, s ∈ S, a in Dτ , and for some m ∈ Y, f(g)(s)(a)
= m(g{α/a})(s). }
Lambda-abstraction defined this way does support η-reduction.35 Since this
more general way of assigning a value is not needed to provide a semantics for
the other constructs of LSUL, I will continue using a function [[.]]M,g,d, but the
reader should keep in mind that a denotation function of this form is needed to
deal with lambda abstraction, hence, with quantification. (And for referential
ambiguity, as we will see below.)
34I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this solution to the problem just
discussed, much simpler than the solution proposed in (Poesio , 1994).
35The proof is as follows. [[λα. β(α)]]M,d = {f ∈ (Ass → (S→ (Dτ → Dτ ′))) such that
for all g ∈ Ass, s ∈ S, a in Dτ , and for some m ∈ [[β(α)]]M, f(g)(s)(a) = m(g{α/a})(s). }
Because of the definition of [[β(α)]]M,d, this is the set of functions f such that f(g)(s)(a) =
p(g{α/a})(s)[q(g{α/a})(s)], for some p ∈ [[β]]M and some q in [[α]]M, i.e., of the functions
which occur in [[β]]M since q(g{α/a})(s) = a.
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5.1.5 Quantification
The treatment of quantifiers in LSUL is based on Generalized Quantifiers The-
ory (Barwise and Cooper , 1981), i.e., the idea that determiners denote relations
between two sets. The ‘restricted quantification’ notation used in the examples
above is defined in terms of the two determiners every and a, as follows:
• (∀ x: Φ (Ψ)) ≡def every(λx. Φ,λx. Ψ)
• (∃ x: Φ (Ψ)) ≡def a(λx. Φ,λx. Ψ)
A ‘single-valued’ semantics for every(λα. Φ,λα. Ψ) could be defined, in first
approximation, as in the following clause:
• Let F,G be meaningful expressions of type 〈e,t〉. Then every(F,G) is a
meaningful expression of type t , and [[every(F,G)]]M,g,d is the function f
s.t.
f(s) =


undefined iff either [[F]]M,g,d or [[G]]M,g,d are
undefined;
1 iff {a ∈ U s.t. [[[F]]M,g,d(s)](a) = 1 } ⊆
{b ∈ U s.t. [[[G]]M,g,d(s)](b) = 1 }.
0 otherwise.
This definition can be generalized as follows into one that works in the case in
which [[.]]M,g,d is a set:
• [[every(F,G]]M,g,d =
{f | there is an h ∈ [[F]]M,g,d and an h′ ∈ [[G]]M,g,d such that
f(s) =


undefined iff either h(s) is undefined or h′(s) is undefined;
1 iff for every a s.t. [h(s)](a) = 1, [h′(s)](a) = 1.
0 otherwise.
}
The interpretation of expressions of the form a(λα. Φ,λα. Ψ) is defined in a
similar fashion, with the obvious semantics.
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5.1.6 Scope Disambiguation by Defeasible Inference
Having extended the language into one that can be used to describe scopal un-
derspecification, the framework for discourse interpretation developed in section
§4.2 can also be used to formalize the inferences involved in scope disambigua-
tion. Partially disambiguated interpretations can be represented by expressions
which mix logical forms with ‘traditional’ expressions, as done in DRT. For
example, one could formalize Ioup’s (1975) Grammatical Function Principle,
stating that an NP in subject position by default takes scope over NPs in other
position, as follows:
GRAMMATICAL-FUNCTION-PRINCIPLE
S
NP VP
λQ. (∀ y: p(y) (Q(y)))
: : (∀ y: p(y) (
S
NP VP
y
))
(∀ y: p(y) (
S
NP VP
y
)) :
Logical forms in LFS are sentential expressions, and can therefore serve as trig-
gering condition of discourse interpretation principles. They can also occur
embedded in other expressions of LSUL. During the scope disambiguation pro-
cess, ‘less ambiguous’ expressions are inferred by deriving expressions such as (∀
y: p(y) ([S [NP y] [VP α]])) in which some quantifiers have been extracted, by
a process very similar to the one used in the top-down version of the DRT con-
struction algorithm (Kamp and Reyle , 1993). ‘Partial’ scopal disambiguation
is thus represented by LSUL expressions which still contain logical forms.
As some readers will have already observed, the rule GRAMMATICAL-
FUNCTION-PRINCIPLE does not satisfy the Anti-Random restriction pro-
posed in §4.2: the rule does not contain a non-trivial restriction on the contexts
in which it can operate. The already mentioned proposal in (Poesio , 1994)
overcomes this problem by making the activation of scope disambiguation rules
depend on whether the appropriate domain for the quantifier (its resource
situation) has been identified; a presentation of that proposal would however
require introducing too much additional material.
5.2 Referential Ambiguity
5.2.1 Referential Expressions as Cases of Semantic Ambiguity
Yet another way in which the semantics of sentences is ‘underspecified’ by their
syntax is in the interpretation of anaphoric expressions and other expressions
whose interpretation has to be fixed in context. In semantics, referential expres-
sions are traditionally translated as free variables whose interpretation depends
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on the choice of an assignment function (for the cases of deictic anaphora) or by
assigning them the same variable bound by the quantifier that serves as their
antecedent (for the cases of bound anaphora). This translation does capture the
intuition that the truth conditions of a sentence containing a referential expres-
sion can only be evaluated after fixing the value of the referential expressions. It
is also clear, however, that distinct propositions are obtained depending on the
value assigned to these expressions, much as distinct propositions are obtained
depending on the choice of an interpretation for lexical items, or of a scope for
operators: in other words, a sentence which includes a referential expression
is semantically ambiguous much in the way a sentence containing a lexically
ambiguous item is.36
A complete discussion of reference interpretation would require introducing
a formalization of context, so I will only consider here the issue of providing
an underspecified treatment of intra-clausal and deictic anaphora. I propose
that referential expressions are cases of semantic ambiguity, and translate into a
special kind of underspecified object that I will call parameters. Semantically,
a parameter is a type e expression that, in a discourse situation d, denotes a set
of functions from situations to elements of De in d. For example, the pronoun
he would translate into a parameter x˙ which, in a discourse situation d with
constituents a1 . . . an, and given the set S of situations, will denote a set of
functions {f1, . . . , fm, . . . } from situations in S to a1 . . . an, including at least
the set of all constant functions that map each situation s into aj if aj is a
constituent of that situation (see below), and the set of all variable denotations.
The reader will immediately realize that parameters are the equivalent for type
e expressions of ‘underspecified predicates’ like croakU introduced above.
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More formally, I propose to extend the set of terms of LSUL with a new
class of parameters, whose interpretation is defined as follows. First of all, let us
reformulate the semantics of variables given before, and make variables functions
from assignments to values (rather than the other way around). This involves
again using as interpretation function one that maps expressions into functions
36Pinkal takes pretty much the same position in (Pinkal , 1995). He also introduces a dis-
tinction there between a ‘speaker-oriented’ perspective on meaning versus a ‘hearer-oriented’
perspective. A speaker may well have a single interpretation in mind for a particular anaphoric
expressions, but the hearer may have to recover this interpretation among the many that are
possible in that particular context. This is of course true of all kinds of ambiguities, also
those which have a pragmatic rather than a semantic nature, but in the case of referential
ambiguity, the alternative interpretations correspond to distinct propositions in the semantic
sense as well.
37The term ‘parameter’ comes from Situation Semantics (e.g., (Gawron and Peters , 1990)),
where the lexical items whose interpretation depends on context are called parametric, in
the sense that their interpretation depends on the value assigned in context to one or more
parameters. Parameters are also used in situation theory to translate pronouns and other
anaphoric expression; but although the name and the ‘dotted’ notation is preserved here, the
parameters I have just introduced are an entirely different type of objects than the parameters
of situation theory, which are a special sort of objects in the universe, entirely distinct from
individuals.
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from assignments to meanings, as done for lambda-abstracts.
• For α a variable of type τ , [[α]]M,d = the singleton set {f}, where f is a
function f : Ass → (S → Dτ ) such that for every assignment g, f(g) is a
constant function from S → Dτ .
This definition of the meaning of a variable allows us to abstract away from
assignments. We can now define the semantics of parameters as follows:
• For α a parameter of type τ , [[α]]M,g,d =
⋃
βτ
[[βτ ]]
M,d (the union of the
denotation of all variables of type τ)
⋃
{f | f : S → Dτ is a function such
that for each s, f(s) = a, where a is an object of τ that is a constituent of
a situation s′ which in turn is a constituent of the discourse situation d, if
a is a constituent of s; f(s) = undefined otherwise.}.
For example, if the subset of De in d consists of the two atoms j and b, then
[[x˙e]]
M,g,d = {f1,f2,. . . fi,. . . }, where f1, f2 etc. are the functions that may serve
as the denotation of constants and variables—f1 is the function that maps each
situation of which j is a constituent into j, f2 is the function that maps each
situation of which b is a constituent into b— and the other functions represent
all the possible denotations of objects that the parameter may be resolved to.
Note that the discourse situations plays here the role played by the variable
assignment in ‘free variable’ theories of context dependence.
The grammar presented in the previous section can be straightforwardly
extended as follows to generate sentences such as It croaked:
• PRO → it; x˙
• NP → PRO; [NP [PRO PRO
′]]
The definition of the interpretation of logical forms given above already gives
the correct results for these cases.
5.2.2 Parameters and Discourse Interpretation
Referential ambiguity gets ‘resolved’ by anchoring a parameter. A parameter
is anchored if only one among the functions in its denotation results in a
consistent interpretation of the set of sentences in which the parameter occurs;
a parameter can be anchored by means of equality statements of the form [x˙
= a], where a is not parametric, or is already anchored: such equality state-
ments make all but one of the interpretations of the parameter inadmissible.
Once a parameter is anchored, it can be ‘replaced’ by a term that denotes the
one function among those in the interpretation of the parameter that does not
result in an inconsistent interpretation, much as in the previous discussion of
lexical disambiguation, an H-type ambiguous predicate could be replaced by
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a disambiguated version. So, the discourse interpretation principles formaliz-
ing pronoun disambiguation involve a rewriting operation, just as the discourse
interpretation principles formalizing lexical disambiguation.
An apparent disadvantage of the present theory with respect to the ‘free
variable’ theory of context dependence is that we can derive from the latter
that the value of referential expressions has to be fixed in order to get the
meaning of the sentence in which they occur. A conversation is infelicitous
unless the referents of all pronouns and definite descriptions have been identified,
the domain of quantification of all quantifiers has been appropriately restricted,
and so forth: so much so that listeners appear to be ready to accomodate new
information (e.g., to introduce into the discourse some otherwise unspecified
antecedent for a pronoun) rather than leave the interpretation unspecified (Lewis
, 1979). But this fact about referential expressions also follows if we treat context
dependence as a case of (H-type) semantic ambiguity; it is just a corollary
of Pinkal’s precisification imperative, from which I derived the Condition on
Discourse Interpretation in section §4. Accomodation procedures can then be
seen as a way of ‘precisifying’ in lack of sufficient information.
5.3 Syntactic Ambiguity
The one case of ambiguity that requires extending the framework introduced
here considerably is syntactic ambiguity, as in They saw her duck. Furthermore,
I haven’t considered the problem of structural disambiguation in any detail.
I refer the interested readers to (Poesio , 1994; Poesio , 1995) for a sketchy
discussion of how to encode encoding syntactic ambiguity in an underspecified
representation.38
6 Discussion
I have suggested that to develop a theory of discourse interpretation that is
consistent with what we know about the problem of ambiguity, we need to look
both at the grammar and at discourse interpretation. I proposed a theory of
grammar consistent with what I have called the Underspecification Hypothesis
and which is not based on the assumption that all natural language expressions
can be disambiguated; and a theory of discourse interpretation according to
which a perceived ambiguity occurs when defeasible interpretation principles
result in conflicting hypothesis. The interpretation process is subject to two
38Most systems making use of underspecified representations perform structural disambigua-
tion independently from the other forms of disambiguation (Schubert and Pelletier , 1982;
Allen , 1987; Hobbs and Shieber , 1987; Alshawi , 1992). There is evidence, however, that
structural disambiguation interacts at least with reference interpretation (Crain and Steedman
, 1985; Altmann and Steedman , 1988) and a lot of the recent work on statistical parsing relies
on the hypothesis that lexical interpretation affects parsing as well. Nothing in the proposal
relies on structural disambiguation occurring prior to the other stages of disambiguation.
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constraints: the Anti-Random Hypothesis (interpretations are not generated
at random) and the Condition on Discourse Interpretation, derived from the
Precisification Imperative (H-type ambiguity has to be resolved). Although
treatments of disambiguation based on defeasible reasoning have been proposed
elsewhere in the literature (e.g., in (Alshawi , 1992)), I am not aware of any
discussion of the characteristics of this inferential process, the consequences of
reasoning with an underspecified representation, or the need for constraints on
the inference rules.
In the theory, semantic ambiguity is characterized model-theoretically in
terms of multiplicity of sense, whereas perceived ambiguity is characterized in
terms of inference. One may wonder if the distinction is really necessary; i.e.,
if it is really the case that the meaning of natural language expressions can be
specified a priori. Two arguments in favor of a distinction are that it provides
for a clean distinction between the role of grammar and the role of discourse
interpretation; and that perceived ambiguity may also reflect non-semantic dis-
tinctions, e.g., distinctions in speech act interpretation; this question is not
however totally resolved in the paper.
There are two obvious directions in which the present model needs to ex-
tended: to provide a model of syntactic ambiguity, and to account for the effect
of incrementality in sentence processing. Preliminary work in this direction is
discussed in (Poesio , 1995).
An issue that deserves further inspection is whether the formal similarity
between the system used here to assign a denotation to indefinite sentences,
and the systems developed by Hamblin for dealing with questions (Hamblin
, 1973) and by Rooth for its alternative semantics (Rooth , 1985) has some
significance. In particular, it would be interesting to explore the consequences
of using parameters as the translation of focused elements.
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